Montclair State University

Montclair State University Digital
Commons
Department of Accounting and Finance Faculty
Scholarship and Creative Works

Department of Accounting and Finance

1-1-2017

The Information Content of Dividend Initiation Announcements:
The Case of Information Technology Firms
Susana Yu
Montclair State University, yus@mail.montclair.edu

Gwendolyn Webb
City University of New York

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.montclair.edu/acctg-finance-facpubs
Part of the Accounting Commons, Corporate Finance Commons, and the Finance and Financial
Management Commons

MSU Digital Commons Citation
Yu, Susana and Webb, Gwendolyn, "The Information Content of Dividend Initiation Announcements: The
Case of Information Technology Firms" (2017). Department of Accounting and Finance Faculty
Scholarship and Creative Works. 120.
https://digitalcommons.montclair.edu/acctg-finance-facpubs/120

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Accounting and Finance at Montclair
State University Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Department of Accounting and Finance
Faculty Scholarship and Creative Works by an authorized administrator of Montclair State University Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@montclair.edu.

The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available on Emerald Insight at:
www.emeraldinsight.com/0307-4358.htm

MF
43,7

The information content of
dividend initiation announcements
The case of information technology firms

794

Susana Yu
Montclair State University, Upper Montclair, New Jersey, USA, and

Received 18 October 2015
Revised 24 March 2017
Accepted 31 March 2017

Gwendolyn Webb
Baruch College – CUNY, New York, New York, USA
Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the dividend initiation announcements made by firms in
the information technology sector as defined in a modern system of industrial classification.
Design/methodology/approach – On the basis of a modern classification of the information technology
industry, the authors examine a wide range of corporate performance and management measures to
discriminate between the two theories of the information revealed by the announcement of dividend
initiations, the signaling, and life cycle theories.
Findings – The empirical results are more consistent with the corporate life cycle theory of dividends than
with the information signaling hypothesis. This finding helps clarify the nature of the information revealed
by the announcement.
Originality/value – The paper has clear implications for investors who are interested in the growth
prospects of technology firms, or for others interested in their prospective stability and degree of maturity.
Keywords Market efficiency, Information content of dividend announcements
Paper type Research paper

1. Introduction
Brav et al. (2005) survey 384 financial executives about their decisions to initiate the
payment of cash dividends, to set the levels of subsequent dividend payments, and to
manage share repurchase programs. They find that executives view distributions made via
cash dividends and share repurchase very differently. They consider the initiation of
payment of cash dividends as a relatively binding commitment on the part of the firm,
and importantly, one that lacks the flexibility of share repurchase:
The inflexibility of dividends, once a company starts paying then, acts as a strong deterrent to
dividend initiation. CFOs argue that dividend inflexibility makes non-dividend-paying firms
hesitant to begin paying dividends in the first place.
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Brav et al. (2005) also find that subsequent decisions about the level of the dividend
payments are made with a level of priority on par with that of investment decisions, and that
managers are strongly averse to cutting dividends. In contrast, share repurchases offer
much greater flexibility, and can be reduced or increased in ways consistent with current
investment needs, liquidity, and free cash flows.
In this paper, we focus on the initiation of cash dividend payments. Because this action
reflects managers’ commitment to a relatively binding promise to maintain the payments in
the future, it is a decision that is quite distinct from that of the much more flexible share
repurchase program. Thus, our focus is not on the firm’s decisions on distributions to
shareholders, but instead, it is on their adoption of the policy to initiate the payment of
cash dividends.
On March 19, 2012, Apple Inc. announced that it planned to pay its first quarterly cash
dividends to shareholders since 1995[1]. This announcement sparked considerable investor
interest in the implications for Apple’s profitability and growth prospects. Its stock price rose

2.7 percent on that day, much higher than the 0.4 percent increase in the S&P 500 Index.
Just a few weeks later, on June 12, Dell Inc., another computer manufacturer, announced its
own plan to start paying dividends to shareholders later in 2012. The market also welcomed
the announcement by pushing its stock price up more than 3 percent in after-hours trading.
Similar news has been reported about other technology bellwether firms like Cisco Systems,
Inc., Microsoft Corporation, and Hewlett-Packard Company. Some have argued that these are
cases in which a technology firm matures and finds it more difficult to maintain high-growth
rates and is then forced to change its dividend policies. This interpretation reflects the
corporate life cycle theory of dividends.
Extending the theory of a firm’s life cycle to corporate decisions, Grullon et al. (2002)
relate changes in dividend policy to changes in a firm’s life cycle as firms are more likely to
pay cash dividends as they mature and their investment opportunities decline. Lower
returns on investment put increasing pressure on management to return cash to
shareholders. They suggest, therefore, that announcements of dividend increases contain
information about changes in a firm’s life cycle. When a mature firm is faced with declining
returns on investment, growth rates and risk, it may begin accumulating excess cash
balances. When cash balances grow to the point that they exceed what the firm can invest
profitably, managers are pressed to return cash to the shareholders. The life cycle
(or maturity) theory of dividends is in sharp contrast to the signaling theory of dividends,
which predicts that a firm initiates (and subsequently raises) dividends to signal that its
growth and profitability prospects have improved.
Do earnings indeed increase after dividend initiation announcements as the signaling
theory predicts? The evidence is inconclusive. Healy and Palepu (1988) provide support to
the signaling theory of dividends as firms in their dividend initiation sample continue to
experience rapid earnings growth in at least the two years following their dividend initiation
announcements. On the other hand, Benartzi et al. (1997) find no unexpected earnings
growth in the years after these firms’ dividend increase announcements. Dyl and Weigand
(1998) also conclude that firms’ earnings do not increase following the dividend increase
announcements. Additional evidence provided by other researchers is reviewed below;
overall, this research does not find evidence of clear linkages between announcement effects
and subsequent earnings.
In this study, we focus on dividend-initiating firms and their competitors in the
information technology sector. This sector is the subject of intense investor and analyst
interest and has long been characterized with hyper growth, high margins, high volatility,
and high risk. The life cycles of information technology firms are different than those of
traditional industries because their products and services are prone to quick obsolescence.
Due to heavy competition in the industry, reinvestment often has a high priority when it
comes to decisions on the uses of cash and cash flows.
Any announcements that reveal information about the future prospects of these firms
are of potential value to investors. Because changes in a firm’s dividend policies are usually
accompanied by significant announcement period returns, they convey information.
However, it is critical to understand what information is actually being revealed. In this
paper, we examine a wide range of corporate data on returns, assets, and profitability to
answer this question for the information technology firms.
A barrier to formal research of the technology industry in the past is that this industry is
not well defined in traditional industry classification systems like the Standard Industry
Classification (SIC) codes. The SIC codes were originally developed by the Securities and
Exchange Commission in 1937. Instead, we use the Global Industry Classification System
(GICS), which was developed by MSCI and Standard and Poor’s in 1999 to provide complete,
standard industry definitions on a global basis. It is updated annually to ensure that it
accurately represents all industries in the universe of equity investments. It particular,
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GICS is much more reliable than SIC in identifying firms in recently developed and rapidly
changing industries, especially those like information technology, computer technology,
bio-technology, and financial services.
In addition to the use of the GICS classifications, this paper differs from prior research in
several ways. First, as pointed out by Dyl and Weigand (1998), most dividend-initiating firms
announce their first payout when they are relatively small in size. By contrast, information
technology firms like Cisco System, Inc., Microsoft Corporation, and Hewlett-Packard
Company, were already sizeable when they announced their first dividend payouts.
Second, by matching these firms with non-dividend-paying firms from the same industry and
with similar equity market value, we are able to study any information spillover effects of
dividend initiation announcements in industries dominated by a few behemoths. Third, many
prior researchers, including Howe and Shen (1998), had to drop many, if not most, NASDAQ
firms in their analyses because the databases did not include their SIC codes. Because the
GICS classifications are available for most of the relatively young technology firms traded in
NASDAQ, our sample is much more complete.
In brief, our key empirical findings provide support to the corporate life cycle theory but
not to the signaling hypothesis of dividends. We find no evidence of significant long-term
excess returns in the three-year period following announcement, nor do we find increases in
returns on investments or the rate of growth in sales in the following three years. Compared
to their non-dividend-paying rivals, dividend-initiating technology firms have lower
long-term debt burdens, lower capital expenditures, but higher cash and short-term
investments. Together, these factors help explain their dividend initiation decisions in the
context of the life cycle hypothesis.
The finding that dividend initiations in information technology firms are more consistent
with the life cycle theory helps clarify the nature of information revealed by the
announcement. It also has clear implications for investors who are interested in the growth
prospects of technology firms, their prospective stability, and level of maturity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We review prior studies related to dividend
initiations in the next section. Our data and sample are described in Section 3. Test
methodologies and empirical results are discussed in detail in Section 4. In the final section,
we summarize our empirical results and draw conclusions for their implications for the
conflicting signaling and life cycle hypotheses.
2. Literature review
One key aspect of dividend policy is that once a firm first pays a dividend, it subsequently
tends to maintain it, and the firm’s managers tend to cut or omit it in only rare circumstances.
For this reason, market participants view the announcement of a dividend initiation as an
informational event of potentially considerable significance. Reflecting the very rich stream of
finance research literature on dividend initiations (and resumptions after several years),
we review major types of empirical evidence grounded in the signaling and life cycle theories.
One of the earlier streams of research focuses on the wealth effects of the announcements.
Asquith and Mullins (1983) were the first to examine the impact of dividend initiation
announcements on stockholders’ wealth by empirically testing 168 announcements made by
firms that initiated cash dividends between 1963 and 1980. To capture the full impact of such
announcements, they focus on firms announcing their first dividend payments since initial
public offerings or the first time in the prior ten years. They find that dividend initiation
generally increases shareholders’ wealth, and that the excess returns in the post-event period
are positively related to the size of the initial dividend payments. These results support the
signaling theory of dividends.
Venkatesh (1989) provides empirical results on the implication of signaling theory based
on the substitutability between dividends and earnings announcements, and on stock

return volatility. The information content of quarterly earnings announcements is found to
decrease[2] after the introduction of cash dividends, as investors are more accurate in their
earnings forecasts after dividend initiations. The author argues that after the introduction of
dividends, investors are able to use information content in dividend announcements as a
substitute for information revealed in earnings announcements. He also finds a decrease in
the stock return volatility after the initial dividend announcement.
Michaely et al. (1995) examine price reactions to dividend initiation announcements made
between 1964 and 1988 by firms listed in New York and American Stock Exchanges.
Testing both short and long-term price effects, they find an average increase of more than
3 percent in the three-day window, and positive price drift over periods of up to five years.
However, their findings on the long-term price drift are replicated by Boehme and
Sorescu (2002) only for stocks in the same period and only for equally weighted portfolios.
This contrary evidence suggests that the effects of dividend initiations may be
heterogeneous, and clouds our understanding of what is being signaled.
Others tested the signaling theory of dividends by examining whether dividend initiations
are associated with higher future earnings. Benartzi et al. (1997) find no evidence to support
the view that changes in dividends convey information about future earnings changes.
Consistent with this, Ho and Wu (2001) find that estimates of earnings increases following
dividend initiations are reduced when survivorship bias is controlled for. As with the
empirical findings on stock returns, others find different evidence. Lipson et al. (1998) find that
post-announcement earnings increases and earnings surprises for dividend-initiating firms
are more favorable than those for non-dividend-initiating firms. This suggests that dividends
signal differences in performance between otherwise comparable firms. They also find that
dividend initiations provide a valid signal to differentiate between dividend-initiating firms
from otherwise comparable non-dividend-initiating firms because such firms would find it
very burdensome to duplicate the initiating firm’s action.
In summary, evidence on the signaling theory of dividends is mixed. Although the
market response to dividend initiations is positive in the short-run, the evidence of higher
subsequent stock returns and earnings is not clear. This leads to a different stream of
research in this area, which shifts in focus from what the initiation decision might be
signaling to what types of firms make this decision, when, and why they do so. The life cycle
theory focuses on the decision to initiate dividend payments when a firm reaches a stage of
maturity and has cash balances in excess of investment needs.
Howe and Shen (1998) examine characteristics other than stock and firm performance in
their test of whether dividend-initiating announcements are relevant for both the
announcing firms and their rivals, as the announcements may contain information about
market factors or economic conditions that affect all of the firms in an industry. They
examine the stock prices of industry competitors and analysts’ earnings forecasts,
but conclude that the information conveyed to the market by the decision to initiate
dividends contains no industry-wide component. This result is instructive because it
suggests that the firms that initiate dividends have unique characteristics, circumstances,
and motivations not shared by other firms in the same industry.
Extending the life cycle theory of corporate decisions, Grullon et al. (2002) suggest that
increases in dividends can signal changes in a firm’s life cycle, such as a transition from a
higher to a lower growth phase. As excess cash builds up, non-dividend-paying firms are
forced to decide whether to use these funds in their pursuit of growth through sub-optimal
investments or to return them to their owners.
DeAngelo et al. (2006) test the life cycle theory by looking at the firm’s mix of earned and
contributed capital. They find a significant relation between the initiation decision and this
mix, after controlling for profitability, growth, firm size, total equity, cash balances,
and dividend history. They further find that had these firms not paid dividends, their cash
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balances would have been excessive and their long-term debt minimal, possibly allowing
managers considerable financial freedom.
Bulan et al. (2007) find that dividend initiations are more likely to be announced by
large profitable firms with relatively large cash balances but low earnings growth rates.
They do not find shift in systematic risk or significant improvement in profitability or
growth around dividend initiation announcements. They further find that dividend
initiations are likely announced by firms that have reached the mature stage of their life
cycles. They conclude that dividend initiators are more mature than the non-initiators;
initiators are larger, more profitable, have higher cash balances, have fewer growth
opportunities, and have risk characteristics resembling those of value firms. They also
conclude that a high dividend premium gives a further boost to these firms’ already high
propensity to pay, which leads to an initiation.
Fargher and Weigand (2009) separate all dividend-initiating firms into quartiles based on
their market-to-book ratios. Their findings suggest that shareholders of value stocks with
lower market-to-book ratios gain the most when these firms make their dividend initiation
announcements. They find no evidence that positive dividend events signal higher future
profitability in all quartiles and no change in the ratio of capital expenditure to total assets
for any of the quartiles. This result is consistent with the life cycle theory, as well as with the
otherwise lack of clarity on the signaling theory evidence.
Our analysis of dividend initiation announcements builds on this rich stream of literature
on the signaling and life cycle theories. Information technology is a particular industry of
special interest to many investors. Our underlying research motivation is to determine
which of the two types of theories – signaling or life cycle – is more applicable to them.
3. Data and sample
We use the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) monthly databases to identify
taxable cash dividends announced by NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ companies (with Share
Codes 10 and 11) between 1964 and 2011. Common shares in the CRSP monthly database
with a two-digit GICS code of 45, the information technology sector, are included in our
sample[3]. Our study focuses on the period between 1980 and 2010 for three reasons:
although the GICS industry classification system better incorporates new industries than
the SIC system, it was not generally available until the 1990s. Our study uses stringent
criteria in identifying non-dividend-paying comparison or rival stocks and it was only 1979
before the number of technology common stocks reached as many as 300. Data from both
CRSP and COMPUSTAT databases are needed in our post-event study, which are not
available at the time of this study for dividend-initiating firms in 2011. Following prior
research, we require each stock to have at least three years of data in the CRSP database.
We define a dividend initiation as the first taxable cash dividend payment reported on
the CRSP database or a resumption of cash dividend payment after no cash dividends were
paid for at least four years[4]. This leaves a total of 194 firms initiating or resuming their
cash dividends to their shareholders between 1980 and 2010[5].
We employ two benchmarks. First, we adjust announcement period stock returns for the
market, based on that stock’s CRSP market capitalization decile portfolio. Second, we form a
comparison sample of non-dividend-paying stocks matched on size (based on CRSP annual
market-cap decile) and industry (based on eight-digit GICS code). We are able to match 182
(or 93.8 percent) of our dividend initiation sample with one or more common stocks which
did not pay any cash dividends in the prior four years with the same CRSP market-cap
decile and GICS industry. We identify further one or more comparison stocks with same
CRSP market-cap decile and six-digit GICS code for another nine dividend-initiating firms.
Comparison stocks are found for the rest of three dividend-initiating firms when the size
difference is allowed within one CRSP market-cap decile.

We first examine detailed characteristics of the dividend-initiating and comparison firms
to determine whether there are significant differences even after selecting them according to
size and industry. A finding that the sample firms are larger, even within the same CRSP
market-cap decile, is evidence supportive of the life cycle hypothesis. To more fully
characterize possible differences between the sample and rival firms, we extend this
analysis to several measures of profitability, leverage, liquidity, and capital expenditures.
If the sample firms differ consistently in these ways from their rivals, that provides evidence
in favor of the life cycle hypothesis.
We report descriptive data of several variables in Table I, using end-of-year or end-of-month
data before dividend initiation announcements. We adopt the two-tailed t-test and Wilcoxon
Signed Rank test to confirm statistical significance, and we Winsorize all data series at the
0.01 level of confidence to modify extreme values. Although the dividend-initiating technology
and comparison firms are in the same CRSP market-cap decile, the average market
capitalization for the announcing firms is $1.673 billion, $0.663 billion larger than that of the
comparison firms. Both the t-statistic and the z-statistic of the Wilcoxon test show that
the difference is statistically significant. Although the average net sales of the announcing
firms are larger than those of their rivals, the difference is not statistically significant.
Dividend-initiating technology firms are significantly more profitable than comparison
firms, according to return on operating assets (ROOA), return on equity, and profit

Dividend
group average

Comparison
group average

t-statistic

Wilcoxon
z-statistic

Size and scale
(1) Market capitalization ($bil)
(2) CRSP market-cap decile
(3) Stock price ($/Share)
(4) Net sales ($mil)

$1.673
$5.844
$16.04
$738.4

$1.010
$5.836
$12.51
$622.3

1.678**
0.026
2.907***
0.599

2.489***
na
4.220***
0.012

Profitability
(5) Return on operating assets
(6) Return on equity
(7) Profit margin
(8) Market-to-book ratio

14.4%
25.5%
14.0%
2.55

7.8%
13.2%
−3.7%
2.60

5.827***
3.695***
4.372***
−0.176

6.441***
4.012***
7.586***
−1.652

Liquidity and capital investments
(9) LT debt to LT assets
(10) Cash equiv. to total assets
(11) Capital exp. to total assets

18.0%
32.9%
3.5%

28.5%
26.7%
5.0%

−3.692***
3.290***
−4.363***

−4.903***
3.506***
−6.272***

Rate of growth in sales and assets
(12) Sales growth rate
(13) Total assets growth rate

9.0%
12.2%

15.8%
15.1%

−2.794***
−1.161

−4.495***
−1.613

Stock performance and characteristics
(14) 12-month total return
25.7%
21.9%
0.687
0.799
(15) Turnover (daily average)
0.7%
0.9%
−2.504***
−4.943***
0.93
(16) β (1-year, daily)
1.05
−2.029***
−3.839***
Notes: The dividend group includes 199 dividend initiation and resumption announcements made by
firms in the information technology sector during the period 1980-2010. For each initiating firm, the
comparison group includes a non-dividend-paying firm with the same GICS industry code and CRSP
market-cap decile. The difference in averages is tested for statistical significance with a two-tailed t-test and
a non-parametric Wilcoxon signed rank test. Data are based on either the most recent year- or month-end
prior to the declaration date of the dividend initiation. ***Significantly different from 0 at 0.01 level using a
two-tailed test
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margin[6] in Table I. They outperformed the comparison firms by 6.6 percent in average
return-to-assets, 12.3 percent in average return-to-equity, and 17.7 percent in average profit
margin; these differences are statistically significant according to both the t- and Wilcoxon
tests. The dividend-initiating technology firms had slightly lower market-to-book
ratios than the rivals, 2.55 vs 2.60 on average, using the market capitalization from prior
end-of-month and book value or total common equity from prior end-of-year. However,
this difference is not significant.
Turning to liquidity and capacity to invest, we find that relative to the comparison firms
at the time of the announcement, the dividend-initiating firms appear to have higher
liquidity, based on the ratio of cash equivalents to total assets; lower debt burdens, based on
the ratio of long-term debt to long-term assets; and lower capital spending, based on the
ratio of capital expenditures to total assets. In all three cases, the differences are statistically
significant. These findings indicate that the initiating firms were in a better position to pay
out cash dividends to their shareholders. This is consistent with the life cycle theory of
dividends, as mature technology firms find themselves in better shape in terms of liquidity
but dwindling investment opportunities.
Rates of growth in sales and total asset growth rates provide additional support to the
life cycle theory of dividends as both of the announcing firms are lower than those of
comparison firms. The average annual sales growth rate of the announcing firms is
9.0 percent, which is 6.8 percent lower than that of the rivals.
Turning last to characteristics of the firms’ stocks, we find no significant difference
between the initiating and comparison firms in the 12-month stock returns as both the t-test
and the Wilcoxon test fail to negate the null hypothesis. Daily turnover as a percentage of
the shares outstanding is 0.7 percent for an average dividend-initiating technology firm,
0.2 percent lower than the daily turnover of an average comparison firm. The average
dividend-initiating technology firm (average one-year β ¼ 0.93) is slightly less risky than an
average firm or its non-initiating counterpart (average β ¼ 1.05).
Overall, as compared to closely matched competitors that pay no dividends, we find the
information technology firms that initiated or resumed payments of cash dividends are more
profitable, have more liquid assets at hand, but have lower debt burdens and fewer
investment opportunities. They trailed their competitors in rates of growth in sales and total
assets. Their stocks were less risky than their competitors’ stocks in terms of market-to-book
ratio, share turnover in trading, and short-term β. These characteristics are consistent with the
life cycle hypothesis. We next turn to tests of returns designed to distinguish directly between
the applicability of the signaling and life cycle theories to information technology firms.
4. Empirical tests and results
Returns
We first explore the information content of the announcements made by the dividend-initiating
firms in our sample. Focusing on both a three-day event period and a 36-month post-event
period[7], we compare returns of their stocks to two benchmarks: the return of the
corresponding CRSP market-cap decile portfolio and the return of the comparison stocks in
the same size and industry group:
ER:Compj ¼

t2
Y

ð1 þRj;t Þ

t¼t 1

ER:Decj ¼

t2
Y
t¼t 1

t2
Y

ð1 þRM:Compt Þ

(1a)

ð1 þRM:Dect Þ

(1b)

t¼t 1

ð1 þRj;t Þ

t2
Y
t¼t 1

where Rj,t ¼ raw daily stock return for firm j on day t, ER.Compj ¼ excess return relative to
the comparison stocks for firm j from time period t1 to t2, RM.Compt ¼ the return of the
comparison stocks on day t, ER.Dec.j ¼ excess return relative to the comparison stocks for
firm j from time period t1 to t2, RM.Dect ¼ the return of the same CRSP market-cap decile
portfolio on day t.
The average excess returns of all dividend initiation announcing firms for each period
are then reported and tested for statistical significance. We adopt both the three-day
period, including both the days before and after each announcement, and the 36-month
post-event period, to examine the short- and long-term impacts of these announcements on
shareholders’ wealth. Significant excess returns would support the signaling hypothesis
of dividends.
Following Fargher and Weigand (2009), we also calculate risk-adjusted returns based on
a single-index market model and a version of the 1993 Fama-French three-factor model that
incorporates the market risk premium (MKTRF), the size premium (SMB), and the value
premium (HML). Daily stock returns are from the CRSP database and time series of the three
risk factors and the risk-free rate are from Dr Kenneth French’s online data library at
Dartmouth College:
Rj;t ¼ aj þbj RMt þej;t

(2)

Rj;t RF t ¼ aj þbj ðM KTRF Þt þlj ðSM BÞt þgj ðH M LÞt þej;t

(3)

where Rj,t ¼ the return of the dividend-initiating stock on day t; RMt ¼ the return of the
CRSP market-cap portfolio on day t; RFt ¼ the one-month Treasury Bill rate on day t;
MKTRFt ¼ Excess return on the market, defined as RMt−RFt; SMBt ¼ size premium,
the average return on three small portfolios minus the average return on three big portfolios;
HMLt ¼ book to market premium, the average return on two value portfolios minus the
average return on two growth portfolios.
The parameters in Equation (2) are estimated using daily data in a 252-day period ending
five trading days before the announcement day, using the CRSP value-weighted index as a
proxy for the market return, RMt. We use data in the same 252-day period to estimate the
parameters of Equation (3).
Overall, the initial market reaction to the dividend initiation news by an information
technology firm is positive, whether after adjustment for the returns of the market or by the
industry rivals’ stocks. According to Panels A and B, Table II, during the three-day event
period, the dividend initiation firms’ stocks experience a significant return of 4.7 percent
above the returns of the CRSP market-cap decile portfolios and 4.6 percent above those of
the comparison stocks. These excess returns are statistically significant according to both
the t-test and the Wilcoxon z-statistics.
However, the outperformance by the announcing firms’ stocks does not continue after
the initial three-day event period, as their half-year performances in the next three years are
closely matched by those of the benchmarks. As a result, the excess returns in Panel A,
Table II, are not significant under a two-tailed t-test and a Wilcoxon signed rank test.
Risk-adjusted returns from he market model in Equation (2) are significantly positive in the
three-day event period (+4.3 percent, t-statistic 5.425) and the first half-year period (+5.4 percent,
t-statistic 2.222), according to Panel C, Table II. However, risk-adjusted returns from the
three-factor Fama-French model in Equation (3) are only significantly positive in the three-day
event period (+4.4 percent, t-statistic 5.636), but not in any of the other six-month periods.
Overall, all four panels in Table II suggest that investors usually respond positively to
the dividend-initiating news by technology firms, showing either significant excess returns
or risk-adjusted returns in the three-day period around the announcement day. Only the
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First 6 months
(+2, 127)

Second 6 months
(128, 253)

Third 6 months
(254, 379)

Table II.
Excess returns after
dividend initiation
announcements
−0.5%
−0.224

2.8%
0.782

−0.984

4.2%
0.973

−0.3%
−0.128

−0.609

−0.4%
−0.139

−0.653

−1.109

3.0%
1.109

−0.458

1.8%
0.538

0.144

1.2%
0.302

Sixth 6 months
(632, 757)

Panel D: Risk-adjusted returns based on the three-factor Fama-French model
Value
4.4%
2.8%
2.1%
−1.5%
2.0%
−2.2%
3.3%
t-statistic
5.636***
1.268
0.869
−0.685
0.546
−1.076
1.198
Notes: Raw returns of dividend-initiating firms are adjusted for each of two benchmarks, the matching CRSP market-cap decile portfolio and comparison stocks, and
tested for significance. We focus on the three-day event period, t ¼ −1 to t ¼ +1, where t ¼ 0 denotes the initiation announcement day, as well as the 36-month post-event
period. Additionally, the market model and the 1993 three-factor Fama-French model are used to estimate risk-adjusted returns for announcing firms. Both a two-tailed ttest and a non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed Rank test are used to confirm statistical significance. ***Significantly different from 0 at 0.01 level respectively, using a twotailed test

2.7%
0.982

−1.498

0.571

−0.346

6.459***

−1.0%
−0.375

returns: raw returns – benchmark: comparison firms
4.6%
3.3%
2.7%
5.605***
1.111
0.906

Panel C: Risk-adjusted returns based on the market model
Value
4.3%
5.4%
t-statistic
5.425***
2.222***

Panel B: Excess
Value
t-statistic
Wilcoxon
z-statistic

−3.5%
−0.872

Fifth 6 months
(506, 631)

2.0%
0.429

Fourth 6 months
(380, 505)
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Panel A: Excess returns: raw returns – benchmark: CRSP market-cap decile portfolio
Value
4.7%
−1.1%
0.8%
−1.1%
t-statistic
5.197***
−0.273
0.202
−0.343
Wilcoxon
z-statistic
5.969***
−0.328
−0.230
−1.142

3-day
(−1, +1)

MF
43,7

market model risk-adjusted returns are significantly positive in the first six months
after the initial three-day event period. All other six-month measures of excess returns or
risk-adjusted returns are either inconclusive or only slightly different from zero,
providing no support for a long-term impact on shareholders’ wealth from the dividend
initiation announcements. This evidence is not supportive of the signaling hypothesis for
these firms.
Efficiency, profitability, and rate of growth in sales
Next, we explore whether dividend initiation announcements by technology firms precede
changes in the announcing firms’ efficiency, profitability, and rate of sales growth.
We include companies with a complete seven-year (−3 to +3) history of annual items from
COMPUSTAT database surrounding the year in which the dividend initiation
announcements were made (year 0). The sample sizes are slightly reduced as a result of
these data requirements. Three measures of profitability and rate of sales growth are
adopted in this section: ROOA, annual earnings scaled by market capitalization of equity,
and the rate of growth in sales.
First, as a measure of a firm’s operating efficiency, the ROOA is defined as the ratio of
operating income before depreciation (COMPUSTAT mnemonic OIBDP) to average total
assets (AT), or:
OIBDPj;t

ROOAj;t ¼ 
ATj;t1 þATj;t =2

(4)

To avoid issues of negative earnings and size biases, we scale annual earnings or net income
(NI) by the market value of equity right before the dividend initiation announcement, or:
E j;t ¼ NIj;t =MVj;0 ;

(5)

where Ej,t is the annual earnings of firm j in year t, scaled by MVj,0, the market value of
equity a week before the announcement date.
The final measure, the rate of growth in sales, is defined as:


(6)
Rate of growth in sales ¼ Salej;t Salej;t1 =Salej;t1
where Salej,t is the firm j’s annual sales in year t.
Average measures of ROOA, scaled NI, and rate of growth in sales are computed for each
company in both the three-year pre-event period (−3 to −1) and the three-year post-event
period (+1 to +3) in addition to the event year (0). Cross-sectional averages of the three-year
pre-event period are compared to both those in the event-year period and the three-year
post-event period. Profitability and growth measures of the dividend-initiating group are
then compared to those of the comparison group and tested for statistical significance.
Differences for the dividend-initiating firms are presented in Panel A of Table III.
The 12.8 percent average ROOA in the three-year post-event period is significantly lower
than the 15.7 percent average in the post-event period, with a −1.914 t-statistic and a −2.494
Wilcoxon z-statistic. Thus the operating efficiency of dividend-initiating firms generally
declines after dividend announcements. However, the post-event decrease in ROOA is not
observed when we use scaled NI as the profitability measure. The average 5.2 percent ratio
in the post-event period is higher than the 2.3 percent in the pre-event period, and their
difference is statistically different from zero according to both tests. Although the average
annual rate of growth in sales in the three-year post-event period (12.5 percent) is lower than
the rate in the three-year pre-event period (14.6 percent), the difference is not significantly
different zero.
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3-year pre-event 3-year post-event
average (%)
average (%)
Panel A: Raw data of the dividend-initiating firms
(1) Return on operating assets (ROOA)
15.7
(2) Net income/market cap of equity (E)
2.3
(3) Annual percentage change in sales (DS)
14.6
Dividend group
average (%)
Panel B: Return on operating assets (ROOA)
(4) Avg., years (−3, −1)
(5) Year 0
(6) Avg., years (+1, +3)
(7) Difference: Yr(0)−Yr(−3, −1)
(8) Difference: Yr(+1, +3)−Yr(−3, −1)

Table III.
Changes in efficiency,
profitability, and rate
of growth in sales
around dividend
initiation
announcements by
technology firms

12.8
5.2
12.5
Comparison
group average
(%)

t-statistic
(%)

Wilcoxon
z-statistic (%)

−1.914*
1.828*
−0.624
t-statistic

−2.494***
1.822*
−1.539
Wilcoxon
z-statistic

15.8
15.5
13.1
−0.4
−2.8

6.1
6.6
6.7
0.5
0.6

7.676***
7.060***
4.806***
−0.939
−2.730***

8.043***
7.450***
5.874***
−0.471
−2.961***

Panel C: Annual net income/market cap of equity (E)
(9) Avg., years (−3, −1)
2.8
(10) Year 0
5.3
(11) Avg., years (+1, +3)
5.3
(12) Difference: Yr(0)−Yr(−3, −1)
2.5
2.5
(13) Difference: Yr(+1, +3)−Yr(−3, −1)

−3.3
−2.6
0.6
0.7
3.9

4.064***
5.565***
3.159***
0.937
−0.700

7.158***
7.195***
4.632***
1.720*
−1.759*

Panel D: Annual rate of growth in sales ( % ΔS)
(14) Avg., years (−3, −1)
14.2
15.7
−0.526
−0.652
(15) Year 0
7.4
10.3
−1.094
−0.372
(16) Avg., years (+1, +3)
10.0
8.2
1.045
1.206
(17) Difference: Yr(0)−Yr(−3, −1)
−6.8
−5.5
−0.346
0.296
(18) Difference: Yr(+1, +3)−Yr(−3, −1)
−4.2
−7.5
1.051
1.810*
Notes: We examine changes in three measures of efficiency, profitability, and rate of growth in sales around
dividend initiation announcements: return on operating assets (ROOA), net income/market cap of equity (E),
and rate of growth in sales (percent ΔS) of both the GICS technology dividend-initiating firms (dividend
group) and comparison firms (comparison group). Only companies with a complete history of data in seven
years (−3 to +3) around the year of the dividend initiation announcement (year 0) are included (The sample
sizes are slightly reduced as a result of these data requirements). Firms in the comparison group are rival
technology firms in the same CRSP market cap decile and GICS industry. Both a two-tailed t-test and a
non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed Rank test are used to confirm statistical significance. *,***Significantly
different from 0 at 0.10, and 0.01 levels respectively, using a two-tailed test

Panel B of Table III, summarizes the differences between the dividend-initiating and
comparison groups on average ROOA. The three-year pre-event average ROOA of the
dividend-initiating group is 15.8 percent, two-and-half times that of the 6.1 percent of
the comparison group, with a 7.676 t-statistic and an 8.043 Wilcoxon z-statistic. Clearly,
dividend-initiating companies are more efficient than their rivals before the dividend
announcements. The dividend-initiating companies remain more efficient than their rivals
in the year that the dividend initiation is announced, as well as in the three years
afterward. Although dividend-initiating technology firms are more efficient than their
non-dividend-paying rivals in both the pre- and post-dividend periods, their dividend
initiation announcements appear to precede a decline in their own ROOA, consistent with
the life cycle theory, and contrary to the signaling hypothesis.
The results based on NI (scaled by market capitalization of equity) are presented in Panel
C of Table III. Dividend-initiating technology firms continue to dominate their non-dividendpaying rivals in this category in both the pre- and post-dividend periods. Both groups are

able to generate higher NIs in the post-dividend period than in the pre-dividend period.
When we compare the improvement experienced by the dividend-initiating firms to the
improvement experienced by rival firms, the results are not significant.
According to Panel D of Table III, the rate of growth in sales of both groups drops in
the three-year pre-dividend period, 14.2 and 15.7 percent, to a (nearly) single-digit
percentage in the three-year post-dividend period, 10.0 and 8.2 percent. Both t- and
z-statistics for these measures fail to provide support for a higher rate of growth in sales
for dividend-initiating firms in all three periods involved, not supportive of the signaling
theory. The Wilcoxon z-statistic (+1.810) in suggests that the slowdown in annual sales
growth experienced by the dividend-initiating firms in the post-dividend period is smaller
than that experienced by their non-dividend-paying rivals. Thus, dividend-initiating firms
appear to be better to weather a sales slowdown in their industry than their non-dividendpaying rivals.

Debt burden, Capex, and cash
We next explore trends in three measures related to liquidity: the long-term debt to the
long-term asset ratio (debt ratio), the annual capital expenditure to total assets ratio (Capex),
and the cash equivalent to total assets ratio (CE)[8]. Averages of these measures are
computed for each company in both the three-year pre- and post-event periods, in addition to
the event year. Cross-sectional averages of the three-year pre-event period are compared
to both those in the event year and the three-year post-event period. All items of the
dividend-initiating group are then benchmarked relative to those of the comparison group
and tested for statistical significance.
First, we examine trends in raw data of dividend-initiating firms after the initiation
announcement, and present the results in Panel A of Table IV. The most notable changes
appear in the debt ratio category. The average ratio of long-term debt to assets declines
from 26 percent in the three-year pre-event period to 17.7 percent in the event year
0 (−1.721 t-statistic and a −4.592 Wilcoxon z-statistic), but then increases to 20.6 percent in
the three-year post-event period (−1.125 t-statistic and a −2.798 Wilcoxon z-statistic).
On average, dividend-initiating technology firms reduce their use of financial leverage
once they start paying cash dividends. The declines in Capex in both the event year and
the three-year post-event period are statistically insignificant. The average level of
liquidity (CE) increases to 31.9 percent in the event year, from 28.8 percent in the
three-year pre-event period. This change is marginally significant with a 1.307 t-statistic
and a 3.570 Wilcoxon z-statistic. In summary, in the announcement year, dividendinitiating technology firms experience a significant decline in their debt ratios, a minor
decline in Capex, but an increase in their short-term liquidity. However, the changes
are only temporary, as the numbers return to levels similar to those in the three-year
pre-event period.
Based on the results in Panels B to D in Table IV, dividend-initiating technology
firms have, in all three periods, a lower debt ratio, a more modest Capex, and a more
liquid (CE) position than their non-dividend-paying rivals. These differences are
confirmed by most if not all t- and Wilcoxon z-statistics. This table helps explain why
the dividend-initiating firms are in a better position to make cash dividend payouts than
their non-dividend-paying rivals.
In addition, we observe from Panel B of Table IV, that both groups reduced their longterm debt burden in the event year and the three years after. Although dividend-initiating
firms cut, on average, a larger percentage of debt ratio than the non-dividend-paying rivals,
their debt reduction is not statistically significant. Similarly, both groups appear to spend
less on Capex in the event year and the three years after (Panel C of Table IV). The reduction
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Table IV.
Debt burden, capital
expenditures, and
cash equivalents
around dividend
initiation
announcements by
technology firms

3-year pre-event
average (%)

Difference (%)

t-statistic

Wilcoxon
z-stat

17.7
20.6
4.6
4.5
31.9
28.8
Comparison group
average

−1.721*
−1.125
−0.556
−0.594
1.307
0.016
t-statistic

−4.592***
−2.798***
−0.986
−1.049
3.570***
0.077
Wilcoxon
z-statistic

Panel B: Debt ratio: long-term debt/long-term assets
(7) Avg in years (−3,−1)
26.9
(8) Year 0
18.3
(9) Avg in years (+1,+3)
20.2
(10) Difference: Yr(0)−Yr(−3,−1)
−8.6
(11) Difference: Yr(+1,+3)−Yr(−3,−1)
−6.7

33.4
32.3
29.3
−1.2
−4.1

−1.417
−3.190***
−2.426***
−2.044***
−0.724

−3.312***
−4.783***
−4.346***
−1.983**
−0.524

Panel C: CAPEX: capital expenditure/total assets
4.7
(12) Avg in years (−3,−1)
(13) Year 0
4.5
(14) Avg in years (+1,+3)
4.4
(15) Difference: Yr(0)−Yr(−3,−1)
−0.3
(16) Difference: Yr(+1,+3)−Yr(−3,−1)
−0.4

6.2
5.3
5.4
−0.9
−0.8

−2.684*** −4.355***
−1.600
−3.472***
−1.876*
−4.165***
1.489
2.389***
1.145
1.540

Panel A: Raw data of the dividend-initiating firms
(1) Debt ratio, year 0 vs pre-3Y
26.0
(2) Debt ratio, post-3Y vs pre-3Y
26.0
(3) Capex, year 0 vs pre-3Y
4.9
(4) Capex, post-3Y vs pre-3Y
4.9
(5) Cash and equiv., year 0 vs pre-3Y
28.8
(6) Cash and equiv., post-3Y vs pre-3Y
28.8
Dividend group
average

Panel D: CE: Cash Equivalents/total assets
(17) Avg in years (−3,−1)
29.0
26.1
1.403
1.349
(18) Year 0
32.1
25.6
3.084*** 3.160***
(19) Avg in years (+1,+3)
29.2
25.2
1.953**
1.715*
(20) Difference: Yr(0)−Yr(−3,−1)
3.1
−0.5
2.927*** 3.321***
(21) Difference: Yr(+1,+3)−Yr(−3,−1)
0.2
−0.8
0.748
0.859
Notes: We examine changes in three variables around dividend initiation announcements: the ratio of
long-term debt to long-term assets (debt ratio), capital expenditure as a percentage of total assets (Capex), and
cash plus short-term investment as a percentage of total assets (CE) of both the GICS technology firms
(dividend group) and the comparison firms (comparison group). Only companies with a complete history of
data in seven years (−3 to +3) around the year of the dividend initiation announcement (year 0) are included
(The sample sizes are slightly reduced as a result of these data requirements). Firms in the comparison group
are rival technology firms in the same CRSP market cap decile and GICS industry. Both a two-tailed t-test and
a non-parametric Wilcoxon signed rank test are used to confirm statistical significance. *,***Significantly
different from 0 at 0.10, and 0.01 levels respectively, using a two-tailed test

in capital expenditure as a percentage of the total assets by the non-dividend-paying firms is
more severe than the percentage reduction by the dividend-initiating firms. Both t-statistics
and Wilcoxon z-statistics indicate statistical significance. It appears that the decision to start
cash dividend payments does not strategically affect these technology firms’ abilities to
make new capital investments.
Panel D of Table IV provides a possible answer to the timing of these firms’ decisions to
start paying cash dividends. Their average ratio of cash equivalents to total assets increases
from 29.0 percent in the three-year pre-event period to 32.1 percent in the event year when
the dividend decisions are announced. The average cash ratio drops in the three-year
post-event period back to a level similar to that in the three-year pre-event period. The surge
in liquidity (CE) in the event year experienced by the dividend-initiating firms contrasts
with a slight decline for the non-dividend-paying firms in the same period. This difference is
statistically significant.

Overall, the technology firms’ decisions to start paying cash dividends to their
shareholders appears to be justified in view of their stronger short-term liquidity positions
than those of their non-dividend-paying rivals. They can afford to pay out cash dividends
as well as reduce their debt ratios without sacrificing their capital expenditures. These
findings provide support of the life cycle hypothesis.

Case of
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β and turnover
In our last set of empirical tests, we examine changes in β from the market model using the
CRSP value-weighted index as a proxy for the market and average daily turnover as a
percentage of the shares outstanding in the three-year pre- and post-event periods. The null
hypothesis is that there is no significant change in β and turnover after dividend initiation
announcements.
First, we examine whether β or daily turnover change significantly for the dividend-initiating
firms between the two three-year periods. Our results are summarized in Panel A of
Table V. The average β of the dividend-initiating firms declines from 1.025 in the threeyear pre-event period to 0.926 in the three-year post-event period and this change is
marginally significant as the t-statistic is −1.563 and the Wilcoxon z-statistic is −2.878.
At the same time, we find no significant change in daily turnover between the two three-year
periods for the dividend-initiating firms, signified by low t-statistic and Wilcoxon z-statistic
in Panel A.
In Panel B of Table V, average β’s of the dividend-initiating firms are compared to those
of their non-dividend-paying rivals. We find that average β’s of the dividend-initiating
firms (1.033 and 0.932) in both periods are significantly lower than those of their
non-dividend-paying rivals (1.179 and 1.070). As the average β’s of the non-dividend-paying
firms decline by equal magnitude between the pre- and post-event periods, the change in
average β’s between these two stock groups is not significantly different from zero
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3-year pre-event
average

3-year post-event
average

t-statistic

Panel A: Raw data of dividend initiation firms
1.025
(1) β (Market model)
(2) Average daily turnover
0.79
Dividend group
average

0.926
0.74
Comparison group
average

−1.563
−2.878***
−0.545
−0.831
t-statistic Wilcoxon
z-statistic

1.179
1.070
−0.109

−2.169*** −4.299***
−2.346*** −3.832***
0.150
0.850

Panel B: β from Market Model
(3) β in 3-yr pre-event (−3,−1)
(4) β in 3-yr post-event (+1,+3)
(5) Spread: Yr(+1,+3)-Yr(−3,−1)

1.033
0.932
−0.101

Wilcoxon
z-statistic

Panel C: Daily turnover (as a percentage of shares outstanding)
(6) Turnover in 3-yr pre-event (−3,−1)
0.81
0.97%
−1.594
−4.367***
(7) Turnover in 3-yr post-event (+1,+3)
0.75%
0.98%
−2.582*** −5.257***
0.01%
−1.064
−0.819
(8) Spread: Yr(+1,+3)-Yr(−3,−1)
−0.06%
Notes: We examine changes in β from the market model and average daily turnover as a percentage of
shares outstanding from the three-year period before to the three-year after dividend initiation announcements by GICS technology firms (dividend group). Only companies with a complete history of data in seven
years (−3 to +3) around the year of the dividend initiation announcement (year 0) are included. (The sample
Table V.
sizes are slightly reduced as a result of these data requirements). Firms in the Comparison Group are rival β and turnover around
technology firms in the same CRSP market cap decile and GICS industry. Both a two-tailed t-test and a
dividend initiation
non-parametric Wilcoxon signed rank test are used to confirm statistical significance. ***Significantly
announcements by
technology firms
different from 0 at and 0.01 levels respectively, using a two-tailed test
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(t-statistic ¼ 0.150 and Wilcoxon z-statistic ¼ 0.850). Market risks faced by technology
firms, both dividend-initiating firms and their non-dividend-paying rivals, seems to wane
as they age.
In Panel C of Table V, average daily turnover (as percentage of shares outstanding)
of the dividend-initiating firms is compared to those of their non-dividend-paying rivals.
We find that average daily turnover ratios of the dividend-initiating firms (0.81 and
0.75 percent) in both periods are significantly smaller than those of the non-dividend-paying
rivals (0.97 and 0.98 percent). As both groups see only minor changes in their average daily
turnover in the three-year post-event period from the three-year post-event period,
the change in average daily turnover between these two stock groups is not significantly
different from zero (t-statistic ¼ −1.064 and Wilcoxon z-statistic ¼ −0.819).
On average, dividend-initiating technology firms have lower market risk as measured by
β and lower common share turnover than those of their rivals in both three-year periods
before and after the dividend initiation announcements. Although a marginally significant
drop in β’s occurs in the dividend-initiating stocks, we observe a decline in β of about equal
magnitude in the comparison stocks during the same period. On the other hand,
no significant change in daily turnover was observed for both groups of stocks in the
post-dividend-announcement period.
5. Summary and conclusions
We examine dividend initiation news by technology firms for several reasons: the traditional
SIC industry classification system is not sufficiently able to identify new industries that have
developed in recent decades, such as computer technology, bio-technology, financial services,
etc. The GICS industry classification system adopted in this study was developed in the 1990s,
and identifies technology firms much more accurately. Information technology firms are
generally considered to be high-growth, high-margin, and high-risk firms and are avidly
followed by analysts and investors. The life cycles of information technology firms are
different from those of traditional industries because their products and services are prone to
quick obsolescence. Due to heavy competition in the industry, reinvestment often has a high
priority in the use of cash and cash flows.
The empirical tests in this study cover several aspects of corporate management and
performance. First, we test the information content of the dividend initiation announcements
by technology firms based on their excess and risk-adjusted returns in the three-day event
period and a three-year period after the announcement. We then examine their operating
efficiencies, profitability, and annual sales growth trends. In the third section, we examine
several variables related to the usage of cash flow and short-term liquidity. In the last
section, we examine the firms’ market risk and trading activities.
Overall, the market responds positively to announcements of dividend initiations by
technology firms, as both significant excess returns and risk-adjusted returns in the
three-day event period surrounding the announcement are observed for these firms’ stocks
but not for those of their rivals. However, positive excess returns and risk-adjusted returns
are rare in the three years after the announcement. Only the market-model risk-adjusted
returns are significantly positive in the first six-month sub-period after the initial three-day
event period. All other six-month measures of excess returns or risk-adjusted returns are
either inconclusive or only marginally different from zero, providing no evidence of a
long-term impact on shareholders’ wealth from these dividend initiation announcements.
This evidence does not provide support for the signaling hypothesis.
We observe a loss of operating efficiency from the dividend-initiating firms in the three
years after their initiation year. But like their rivals, dividend-initiating firms become more
profitable in the post-event period as their NI (scaled by equity market value) rises in the

three years after the initiation. We observe slowdowns in annual sales growth in both
groups, although this slowdown is less severe for the dividend initiation firms than for their
non-dividend-paying rivals.
Our empirical results suggest that the technology firms’ decisions to start paying cash
dividends are well justified as well as financed. Compared to their rivals, these new
dividend-paying firms have sufficient short-term liquidity to reduce their debt burden even
while paying the cash dividends. More importantly, these firms accomplish all of this
without sacrificing their ability to continue making capital expenditures.
Overall our empirical results provide several forms of evidence that support the
corporate life cycle theory of dividend initiation. Compared to their same-sized nondividend-paying rivals in the same industry, dividend-initiating technology firms are more
efficient and profitable and have greater short-term liquidity, lower debt burdens, and fewer
investment opportunities. They also trail their competitors’ growth in sales and total assets.
Our data suggest that their stocks are not as risky as their competitors’ stocks in terms of
market-to-book ratio, turnover, and one-year β. At the same time, our evidence on stock and
firm performance offer no clear support of the signaling theory.
A fundamental question in research on the information revealed by dividend
initiation announcements is to ask exactly what information is being revealed. According
to the signaling theory, the announcement reveals information about managers’
expectations that future earnings will be strong and consistent enough to support
continued cash payouts. According to the life cycle theory, the announcement reveals
information about their expectations that the firm will have fewer investment opportunities,
even in the presence of continued ability to maintain cash payouts on a continuing basis
through future earnings.
Our findings shed new light on the two competing theories of announcement
information, the signaling and life cycle theories, for firms in the technology sector.
While our empirical results on post-event performance of the firms’ stock and operating
performance fail to support the signaling theory, they do show considerable evidence
supporting the life cycle theory. The additional evidence of ROOA, NI, sales growth,
leverage ratio, capital expenditure, and liquidity all support the life cycle hypothesis.
Our findings are significant for investors who are interested in the growth prospects of
technology firms, their prospective stability, and level of maturity. As a relatively new
industry from a historical perspective, the experience of the technology industry offers
insights on possible future trends in dividend theory and practice. Although our findings do
not rule out the possibility that dividend initiations by firms in other industries may be more
closely associated with the signaling motive than their life cycles, our analysis focusses on a
modern industry that may well be as indicative of the industrial landscape of the future as
steel, autos, and railroads were a century ago.

Notes
1. Combined with stock repurchase programs announced on the same day, Apple Inc. expects to
spend nearly $45 billion of cash between the second half of 2012 and 2015.
2. The average price reaction to earnings announcements is smaller in the post-dividend period and
the reduction is statistically significant.
3. The number of technology firms (two-digit GICS industry code ¼ 45) in the CRSP database
increased gradually from 320 in 1980 to a peak of 1,560 in 2000 before dropping gradually to 720 in
2010.
4. Dyl and Weigand (1998) use a four-year cutoff period, while Asquith and Mullins (1983) use a
ten-year cutoff period.
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5. The number of firms falls by about 10 percent between 1980 and 2010 if a ten-year, instead of a
four-year, cutoff period is adopted in identifying valid dividend resuming firms.
6. The following definitions are used: Return on operating assets ¼ operating income before
depreciation (OIBDP in COMPUSTAT)/average total assets (AT in COMPUSTAT); Return on
equity ¼ operating income before depreciation/average common/ordinary equity total (CEQ);
Profit margin ¼ operating income before depreciation/net sales (SALE in COMPUSTAT).

810

7. The 36-month period consists of 36 consecutive 21-trading-day periods. Any periods with
fewer-than-21 days are omitted.
8. All data used in this section are from annual COMPUSTAT databases: Long-term debt
(COMPUSTAT mnemonic DLTT), Long-term debt ¼ total assets (AT) – total current assets
(ACT), Capital expenditure (CAPX), Cash equivalents or cash and short-term investment (CHE).
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